From: owner-krnet-l-digest@teleport.com[SMTP:owner-krnet-l-digest@teleport.com] Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 3:24 PM To: krnet-l-digest@teleport.com Subject: krnet-l-digest V2 #102 krnet-l-digest Monday, June 22 1998 Volume 02 : Number 102 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 16:40:15 -0400 From: Tom Andersen Subject: KR: New KR-2S Website KRNetters, I am pleased to announce that my KR-2S website is ready for its public debut today! You can see it at http://home.att.net/~tomkr2s/index.htm. I've got a few pictures of my boat, some pics of Dave Blucher's KR-2S in Orlando Executive airport, some pics of my EA-81 Soob junker (which by the way I got yesterday), and there's a few pictures of my 1835 VW that I'm selling. Also there is a picture of my 1/4 scale KR-2S which has been hogging up my time lately, a picture of my shop, and even a picture of me sitting in Dave's KR-2S. Hope you enjoy the pics, there's a whole lot more coming up. My learning curve lately has been vertical, with my publishing knowledge doubling about every 4 hours. When I get done with the model KR, I'll have better pictures of the boat as I make more progress there. This is the first web site I've ever done, so please be gentle with any critiques. Mike and Mark, if you prefer different labels for your sites, please e-mail them to me directly, and I'll be happy to oblige. If anyone has any suggestions or requests, please e-mail me directly also. The counter was at 2 as of this e-mail. It is going to be a lot more fun sharing on the web now that I can take a pic and upload it instantly. Maybe my posts will decline in length now that I can show a pic or drawing? I know... what a relief! - -Tom ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 14:13:50 -0700 From: Micheal Mims Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks At 07:09 PM 6/21/98 +0200, you wrote: >of course the bolt(s) must to go through the grain wood i'm ok but not at >random place and certainly not go through the ginder flange.>>> What is it that you are calling a "ginder flange"? zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz Micheal Mims SP290,.. Filling and sanding now! mailto:mikemims@pacbell.net http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/4136/ Irvine Ca Fax 949.856.9417 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 17:59:22 -0700 From: Darrin West Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks aabbcc01@infonie.fr wrote: > > hi , kr builders > > I have a doubt about the design of the connections of outers to the center > spars it's very archaic (but it's not the problem) > What my mind can't accept, it's why they need to make a drilling inside > this vital organs and specially at the end of it.(where the craks are many > probability to occur). > For me this is not a logic and serious design normally, the grinder flange > must stay undrilled(except for metallic spars)but only some reinforcements > parts inside the spar must be drilled for to allow the attaching of the two > parts spar together. > so, the spar don't become weakened (i have also some interrogations to > myself about the attaching of landing gear but, this is least problematic > of this two because easy to solve). > For my concern i don't like to make a such spar. > I hope somebody can to discuss really about this problem and they don't try > to praise only the quality of the actuel spar design . If ever some people > have experience in design of spar or some documents them suggestions are > welcome. > I think is an other road for to increase the performance of kr2s with more > strong wing reqired for an always more speed airplane. > and make it more beside the perfection. > > E.D I think I see your point but how else could you build in any diheidral? Darrin West mailto:dwest@rose.net ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 15:05:13 PDT From: "Richard Parker" Subject: KR: Re: Pulsar ><< Why don't you see the Pulsar in the same category as the KR-2? >> > >It's not as "quick". The only thing slow about the pulsar is the factory support. My friend bought the quick build kit over a year ago ($30k) and has been looking at it since because Skystar hasnt provided him with a complete manual. he's got a $14k 912 in the box waiting for it. Unfortunately the guy is already 83 years old. (he is wishing he was building a kr. at least he could be making sawdust.) It is however real slippery. The cruise for the pulsar 3 is rated at 200kts and the vne is going over 230. Richard E. Parker Jaffrey, NH richontheroad@hotmail.com http://top.monad.net/~theparkers/kr.htm ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 15:10:09 PDT From: "Richard Parker" Subject: KR: West Systems 105 > > >> Can anyone tell me if West Systems 105 epoxy resin can be used as a sui= >table >> substiture for bounding wood to wood as in spar caps to web. >> Thanks Don, Gee I hope so my whole plane is built with it. Richard E. Parker Jaffrey, NH richontheroad@hotmail.com http://top.monad.net/~theparkers/kr.htm ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 21:33:06 EDT From: JEHayward@aol.com Subject: Re: KR: tie down spacing? In a message dated 6/20/98 1:10:22 PM Mountain Daylight Time, langford@hiwaay.net writes: << Anybody know what the "standard" spacing for wing tie downs is? >> Mark, I located mine about 4 or 5 inches from the end of the spar. Jim Hayward Rapid City, SD ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 1998 20:38:57 -0500 From: "Mark Langford" Subject: RE: KR: tie down spacing? Thanks, Larry. That's exactly what I was looking for. I haven't been spending nearly enough time at the airport lately...to busy building the KR. Good thing I installed a block right at the tips yesterday, before I closed them out for good last night... Mark Langford, Huntsville, Alabama mailto:langford@hiwaay.net see KR2S N56ML at http://home.hiwaay.net/~langford/kr2s.html ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 21 Jun 98 10:14:05 CST From: "dboll" Subject: KR: DC from AC I have a Revmaster with Deil case and I can't get any voltage out of it. = Can some one help me out. I have a regulator rectifier from gps. I connec= ted the two wires from the case to the ac terminals and ran the DC+ to = the bat. Nothing happens. Hellp. Thanks Don ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 07:50:39 EDT From: KR2616TJ@aol.com Subject: Re: KR: Re: Pulsar In a message dated 98-06-21 18:06:44 EDT, you write: << It is however real slippery. The cruise for the pulsar 3 is rated at 200kts and the vne is going over 230. Richard E. Parker Jaffrey, NH >> Richard, this was one of the "original" Pulsars with a cruise of like 145-150 and I'll grant you it picked up speed. What I meant by "not as quick" was on the controls. Anyone with average experience can stay ahead of this plane. It has very docile handling characteristic, needs rudder to coordinate turns, is docile in roll, accelerates nicely and sets up well in the pattern. Don't get me wrong, I was impressed. I found it has, ut oh here we go :-)), in my opinion, no bad handling habits.................other than that constant sewing machine sound up front :-)). This is not an endorsement for any airplanes mentioned above and is not the shared opinion of Skystar................I may just be full of $%@ :-)) Back to the KR Dana Overall Richmond, KY mailto:kr2616tj@aol.com http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/7085/ ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 05:30:29 PDT From: "Richard Parker" Subject: Re: KR: Re: Pulsar I agree with you on the original pulsar. Who would want to wet and bend plywood to an airfoil shape anyway? yuck! Rich Parker >Richard, this was one of the "original" Pulsars with a cruise of like 145-150 >and I'll grant you it picked up speed. What I meant by "not as quick" was on >the controls. Anyone with average experience can stay ahead of this plane. >It has very docile handling characteristic, needs rudder to coordinate turns, >is docile in roll, accelerates nicely and sets up well in the pattern. Don't >get me wrong, I was impressed. I found it has, ut oh here we go :-)), in my >opinion, no bad handling habits.................other than that constant >sewing machine sound up front :-)). > >This is not an endorsement for any airplanes mentioned above and is not the >shared opinion of Skystar................I may just be full of $%@ :-)) > >Back to the KR > >Dana Overall >Richmond, KY >mailto:kr2616tj@aol.com >http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/7085/ > ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 08:42:53 -0400 From: Donald Reid Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks aabbcc01@infonie.fr wrote: > > When designing a removable spar that is joined end-to-end, there are a > > limited number of ways to perform the design. There are other methods > > that involve overlapping material but they all involve bolt(s) through > > the grain of the wood. > of course the bolt(s) must to go through the grain wood i'm ok but not at > random place and certainly not go through the ginder flange. I am assuming that "ginder flange" is a spar cap. Bolting and mounting hardware is certainly allowable in that portion of the structure. The design and construction of this type of system is well established. - -- Don Reid Bumpass, Va. mailto:donreid@erols.com KR2XL at http://www.erols.com/donreid/kr_page.htm Ultralights at http://www.erols.com/donreid/usua250.html ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 12:20:44 -0700 From: "John F. Esch" Subject: KR: [Fwd: LOOKING FOR HELP] This is a multi-part message in MIME format. - --------------738A9BF73091F07FFDD0162E Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit - --------------738A9BF73091F07FFDD0162E Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Return-Path: Delivered-To: jesch@cyberis.net Received: (qmail 18325 invoked from network); 22 Jun 1998 15:48:29 -0000 Received: from ns5.rconnect.com (HELO ns1.rconnect.com) (209.163.30.1) by qmail.cyberis.net with SMTP; 22 Jun 1998 15:48:29 -0000 Received: from default (pmsibl1-141.rconnect.com [209.163.2.141]) by ns1.rconnect.com (8.8.7/8.8.7) with SMTP id KAA24028; Mon, 22 Jun 1998 10:40:09 -0500 (CDT) Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 10:40:09 -0500 (CDT) From: aainds@yahoo.com Subject: LOOKING FOR HELP Message-Id: Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN charset=US-ASCII I AM LOOKING FOR A TAYLOR MONO PLANE FLYING OR PROJECT OR A BOWERS FLYBABY I WIIL GIVE $100.00 TO THE PERSON OR CLUB THAT LEADS TO THE PURCHASE,OF THE PLANES OR PROJECT I BUY. I KNOW THAT THE TAYLORS ARE HARD TO FIND,BUT WOULD LOVE TO HAVE ONE BUT FLY BABY WOULD GREAT ALSO PLEASE EMAIL OR CALL CALL TOOL FREE 1 888 754 3980 ASK FOR DAVE THANKS IN ADVANCE DAVE - --------------738A9BF73091F07FFDD0162E-- ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 22:16:36 +0200 From: aabbcc01@infonie.fr Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks Hi, sorry ,I'm mistake in my writing i mean to say "girder flange" if you watch in all wooden spars you can to see parts of spruce or douglas pine in up and down this is called "semelle" in french and girder flange in (english) then every side of the spar have a plywood for to make the box spar what they call in french "longeron caisson" this plywood is for to give a limit to the elongation of fiber wood (young modulus or linear elasticity) when the spar is loaded if ever this limit is over the molecular structure become deteriorated then the cracks or breakage happen. what is important also is the elasticity modulus (Newton\mm²) the wood have nice characteristics if you compare with metal for me no metal spar can to vie with a wooden spar because in metal sonner or later the cracks will appear with tiredness and /or corrosion with wood no corrosion, good resistance to the tiredness the only problem is to find a good design and clean wood that why i spoke about the kr2 spar bolts inside the girder flange because for me the resistance become a little weakened in this aera (it involves only me) Regards E.DEWET - ---------- > De : Micheal Mims > A : krnet-l@teleport.com > Objet : Re: KR: spars cracks > Date : dimanche 21 juin 1998 23:13 > > At 07:09 PM 6/21/98 +0200, you wrote: > >of course the bolt(s) must to go through the grain wood i'm ok but not at > >random place and certainly not go through the ginder flange.>>> > > What is it that you are calling a "ginder flange"? > zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz > Micheal Mims > SP290,.. Filling and sanding now! > mailto:mikemims@pacbell.net > http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/4136/ > Irvine Ca > Fax 949.856.9417 > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 22:25:36 +0200 From: aabbcc01@infonie.fr Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks I think the problem is not in dihedral because you can to design a spar in three parts with or without dihedral i think this spar have not a like design for get only a dihedral i hope i'm understand your sentence. Thanks E.D - ---------- > De : Darrin West > A : krnet-l@teleport.com > Objet : Re: KR: spars cracks > Date : lundi 22 juin 1998 02:59 > > aabbcc01@infonie.fr wrote: > > > > hi , kr builders > > > > I have a doubt about the design of the connections of outers to the center > > spars it's very archaic (but it's not the problem) > > What my mind can't accept, it's why they need to make a drilling inside > > this vital organs and specially at the end of it.(where the craks are many > > probability to occur). > > For me this is not a logic and serious design normally, the grinder flange > > must stay undrilled(except for metallic spars)but only some reinforcements > > parts inside the spar must be drilled for to allow the attaching of the two > > parts spar together. > > so, the spar don't become weakened (i have also some interrogations to > > myself about the attaching of landing gear but, this is least problematic > > of this two because easy to solve). > > For my concern i don't like to make a such spar. > > I hope somebody can to discuss really about this problem and they don't try > > to praise only the quality of the actuel spar design . If ever some people > > have experience in design of spar or some documents them suggestions are > > welcome. > > I think is an other road for to increase the performance of kr2s with more > > strong wing reqired for an always more speed airplane. > > and make it more beside the perfection. > > > > E.D > I think I see your point but how else could you build in any diheidral? > Darrin West > mailto:dwest@rose.net ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 13:36:16 -0700 From: Micheal Mims Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks aabbcc01@infonie.fr wrote: > > Hi, > > sorry ,I'm mistake in my writing i mean to say "girder flange" if you watch in all wooden spars you can to see parts of spruce or douglas pine in up and down this is called "semelle" in french and girder flange in (english)>>>> Are talking about the vertical pieces of spruce inside the spar? (between the spar caps) On my plans only the spar caps have holes drilled in them and not the vertical members. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 23:11:00 +0200 From: aabbcc01@infonie.fr Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks what i mean to say is "girder flange" (parts of spruce in the spar) it's allright this type of system is well established if ever you can to quote to me a modern airplane using exactly this system except the KR . in a friendly way. E.D - ---------- > De : Donald Reid > A : krnet-l@teleport.com > Objet : Re: KR: spars cracks > Date : lundi 22 juin 1998 14:42 > > aabbcc01@infonie.fr wrote: > > > > When designing a removable spar that is joined end-to-end, there are a > > > limited number of ways to perform the design. There are other methods > > > that involve overlapping material but they all involve bolt(s) through > > > the grain of the wood. > > > of course the bolt(s) must to go through the grain wood i'm ok but not at > > random place and certainly not go through the ginder flange. > > I am assuming that "ginder flange" is a spar cap. Bolting and mounting > hardware is certainly allowable in that portion of the structure. The > design and construction of this type of system is well established. > > -- > Don Reid > Bumpass, Va. mailto:donreid@erols.com > KR2XL at http://www.erols.com/donreid/kr_page.htm > Ultralights at http://www.erols.com/donreid/usua250.html ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 23:19:53 +0200 From: aabbcc01@infonie.fr Subject: Re: KR: spars cracks I know it's what i dont like on this design for me it's more good to stay undrilled the spar caps.and in all design of spar what i can to see never the spar caps are drilled it's only some reinforcement in vertical members are drilled. - ---------- > De : Micheal Mims > A : krnet-l@teleport.com > Objet : Re: KR: spars cracks > Date : lundi 22 juin 1998 22:36 > > aabbcc01@infonie.fr wrote: > > > > Hi, > > > > sorry ,I'm mistake in my writing i mean to say "girder flange" if you watch in all wooden spars you can to see parts of spruce or douglas pine in up and down this is called "semelle" in french and girder flange in (english)>>>> > > Are talking about the vertical pieces of spruce inside the spar? > (between the spar caps) On my plans only the spar caps have holes > drilled in them and not the vertical members. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 17:11:30 -0500 From: "Mark Langford" Subject: KR: John Denver Accident Report This is a multi-part message in MIME format. - ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01BD9E00.CC868B00 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit FuelValveHeads, Attached file is the accident report from John Denver's crash in the Long EZ. Given the recent discussions on KR fuel management, I thought it would be appropriate to post. This validates my decision to have NO fuel valves at all. My apologies to those who may have seen it before. Mark Langford, Huntsville, Alabama mailto:langford@hiwaay.net see KR2S N56ML at http://home.hiwaay.net/~langford/kr2s.html - ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01BD9E00.CC868B00 Content-Type: text/plain; name="Denver_Crash.txt" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Denver_Crash.txt" ACCIDENT REPORT LAX98FA008 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On October 12, 1997, shortly after 1728 hours Pacific daylight time, an experimental Adrian Davis Long EZ, N555JD, crashed into the ocean near Pacific Grove, California. The aircraft was destroyed in the collision sequence and the pilot, the sole occupant, received fatal injuries. = Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local personal flight, and = no flight plan was filed. An aircraft maintenance technician who assisted the pilot in removing = the airplane from a hangar prior to the flight was interviewed. He observed = the pilot perform a preflight check, which took about 20 minutes. The pilot borrowed a fuel sump cup and drained a fuel sample to check for contaminants. He did not observe the pilot visually verify the quantity = of fuel onboard the aircraft. The pilot did not check the engine oil level. The technician stated that he and the pilot talked about the = inaccessibility of the fuel selector valve handle and its resistance to being turned. = The handle was located behind the pilot's left shoulder. They tried a pair = of vice grip pliers on the handle to extend the reach of the handle, but = this did not work. The pilot said he would use the autopilot, if necessary, = to hold the aircraft level while he turned the fuel selector valve. According to the maintenance technician's statement, the pilot declined = the offer of fuel service. The pilot told him that he would only be flying = for about an hour. The pilot then got in the aircraft and proceeded with his in-the-cockpit preflight duties, including checking the operation of the control surfaces. According to the technician, he observed the fuel = selector handle in a vertical position. The technician said he went into the = hangar to put away his tools and he heard the engine start; however, it soon = quit. He walked out of the hangar and observed the pilot turned in his seat to = the left toward the fuel selector location. The technician said he believes = the pilot changed the fuel selector and then restarted the engine. A review of the Monterey Peninsula Airport Air Traffic Control Tower = (ATCT) tapes revealed that the pilot contacted ground control at 1702 and = obtained a taxi-for-takeoff clearance from the hangar. At 1709, the pilot = contacted the local controller, reported ready for takeoff on runway 28, and = requested to stay in the traffic pattern for some touch-and-go landings. He was subsequently cleared for takeoff at 1712, and performed three = touch-and-go landings prior to departing the traffic pattern about 1727. During the = final departure, the controller asked the pilot to recycle his transponder = code and the pilot responded. A review of the tape revealed there were no recorded distress calls from the pilot, nor did the pilot indicate any aircraft or engine malfunction. A certified audio cassette re-recording = of the Monterey ATCT local control position was sent to the Safety Board's audio laboratory for analysis. The radio transmissions were examined on = an audio spectrum analyzer to identify any background sound signatures that could be associated with either the engine or the propeller. Nine transmissions between 1714 and 1728:06 were analyzed and produced engine speed harmonics between 2,100 and 2,200 rpm. At the last radio = transmission attributed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the aircraft = at 1728:06, the measured frequency equated to 2,200 rpm. A copy of the laboratory report is attached. About 20 witnesses were interviewed. Some of the witnesses observed the airplane descend into the ocean near Point Pinos, about 150 yards off = shore in 30-foot-deep water. Depending on where they were when the crash = occurred, 4 indicated the airplane was heading westerly, and 5 observed the = airplane in a steep bank, with 4 of those reporting the bank was to the right. = Twelve saw the aircraft in a steep nose down descent, with 6 who saw the plane = hit the water. Witnesses estimated the aircraft to be about 350 to 500 feet = over the residential area while heading towards the shoreline. Eight of the witnesses said they heard a "pop" or "backfire," along with a reduction = in the engine noise level just before the aircraft descended into the = water. PILOT INFORMATION The pilot's logbook was not recovered. During the investigation, the = pilot's FAA airman and medical record files were obtained from the Airman and Medical Records Certification Branch in Oklahoma City. According to the files, his last third-class medical application of record was dated June = 13, 1996, and he reported a total flight time of 2,750 hours. Review of his airman record file disclosed that he held a private pilot certificate, = with airplane ratings for single and multiengine land, single engine sea and gliders. He also held an instrument airplane rating and a Lear Jet type rating. A certified true copy of the pilot's FAA medical records were obtained = and examined. According to the review, the physician who examined the pilot = on June 13, 1996, issued a third-class medical certificate to the pilot at = the conclusion of the procedure. His medical record file showed that on = November 6, 1996, the FAA Civil Aeromedical Certification Division sent the pilot = a letter by certified mail concerning the June 13, 1996, medical = examination and certificate. The letter acknowledges receipt of his medical = application and states in part: "We had previously received an interim report from H. C. Whitcomb, Jr., M.D., pertinent to your alcohol problem. Dr. Whitcomb reported that 'in general averages two to four drinks of either wine or beer/week when = he's traveling.' He further stated that 'there has been no abuse'...and in = our letter of October 18, 1995, we specified that your 'continued airman = medical certification remains contingent upon your total abstinence for use of alcohol." The letter continues by informing the pilot that based on the above he = did not meet the medical standards prescribed in Part 67 of the Federal = Aviation Regulations, and a determination was made that he was not qualified for = any class of medical certificate at that time. The letter further stated: = "If you do not wish to voluntarily return your certificate, your file may be sent to our regional office for appropriate action." According to Postal Service markings on the envelope, the letter was returned unclaimed to = the FAA on December 2, 1996. The above mentioned letter from Dr. Whitcomb was in the file and review = of the document disclosed that he made the following statement to the FAA Aeromedical Certification Division: "In general, he has done remarkably well. For the last three weeks, he = has been on a fast and has had absolutely no alcohol, but in general = averages two to four drinks of either wine or beer/week when he's traveling. = There has been no abuse. The patient seems very happy and balanced at this = stage of his life." Examination of the FAA medical file disclosed that following the return = of the November 6, 1996, letter there was no followup action by the FAA = until March 25, 1997, when the agency sent the pilot a second letter by = certified mail notifying him of their determination of medical disqualification. = The return receipt for the certified letter was examined; however, the = signature of the person who had signed for the mail was not legible. Another Long EZ pilot (further referred to as the checkout pilot), had = given the pilot about 1/2 hour of ground and flight checkout in the aircraft = at Santa Maria, California. He said they performed two touch-and-go = landings and some slow flight maneuvers, and discussed the aircraft systems = including the fuel selector location. He said he had made arrangements with the = pilot to relocate the fuel selector handle while the pilot was away on tour. = He also said that a pillow was added behind the pilot to assist him in = reaching the rudder pedals. The checkout pilot stated that about a month before the accident, he had flown in the front seat with the pilot on a demonstration flight in the accident aircraft. The pilot had flown on two other occasions in the = back seat of other Long EZ's as demonstration flights. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The experimental amateur built canard (1) type aircraft data plate = indicated a manufacture date of June 1987. The aircraft was designed by Rutan = Aircraft Factory and built from the Rutan plans by Adrian D. Davis, Jr. The pitch = and roll of this airplane is controlled by a side stick located on the right-hand armrest. The aircraft was equipped with a single axis roll autopilot but it was not recovered. According to information provided by the operator's manual, the Long EZ = was designed either for a rear mounted Continental O-200 (100 hp) or a = Lycoming O-235 (115 hp) engine. The engine installed was a Lycoming O-320-E3D, producing 150 horsepower. This engine installation required the = installation of 50 pounds of ballast in the nose and consumed 8.5 to 10 gallons per = hour depending on the power setting. An electrical starter was also installed = on the engine. The aircraft designer provided a written statement to the Safety Board = in response to an inquiry regarding the compatibility of the airframe with = the Lycoming O-320 engine. The statement says that "the only engines = approved by the factory for installation" consist of the Continental models O-200 or O-240, or the Lycoming O-235. The designer reported that he is aware of examples of modified Long EZ's which have engines up to 200 horsepower = and that operate at weights 50 percent above the prototype limit, and that = "this level of experience with growth versions does indicate that there are substantial margins in the design." Interviews with the seller and the checkout pilot disclosed that no = ballast was installed in the nose. Two batteries, totaling 40.8 pounds, were relocated in the nose section, one directly in front of the foremost bulkhead and the other just behind it. In addition, the aircraft was equipped with electric force bias trim system for both the pitch and = roll axis, and, an electrically actuated speed brake which deploys from the fuselage belly. The switches for the electric trim and the speed brake = were located on the side stick controller. The FAA records indicate that the current seller purchased the airplane = from the builder on March 5, 1994. On April 13, 1996, the seller changed the registration number from N5LE to N228VS. According to the seller, the airplane was sold to the pilot on September 27, 1997. The airplane was = then flown from Santa Ynez to Santa Maria, California, by the checkout pilot = for the seller for a new paint job in connection with the sale to the pilot. = At that time, the current registration number of N228VS was changed by the pilot to N555JD during the repainting of the aircraft. The painting job at Santa Maria consisted of sanding, priming, and = painting. Telephone interviews with personnel at the paint shop revealed that the = old paint was not stripped off. No control surfaces were removed at any = time. The only items removed during the painting were the two wing mounted = cargo pods, which were painted in a multicolored scheme and reinstalled. The canard was painted all white with no trim stripes. The paint shop = provided the data that as applied, the paint weighs about 4 pounds per 100 square feet. During the investigation copies of a recent empty aircraft weight and balance based on actual weighing was located at Craftsmans Corner, Santa Paula, California. The date of the procedure was May 18, 1996, and = listed an aircraft empty weight of 1,061 pounds, and center of gravity (CG) of = 110.0. This aircraft empty weight and CG did not include the new paint applied = at Santa Maria. In an interview, the manager of Scaled Composites, Inc., = (Rutan Aircraft) estimated the total wetted area of the aircraft and opined = that the paint job added 30 pounds to the empty weight for a total of 1,091 pounds with a CG at 110.0 inches. Based on this recent weight and balance document and estimates by the = Safety Board of the fuel load onboard at departure from Monterey, gross weight = and CG conditions at departure and at the accident were calculated and are appended to this report. At the beginning of the accident flight, the aircraft had a gross weight of 1,310 pounds, with a CG at 103.65 inches. = At the time of the accident, the gross weight was 1,280 pounds, with a CG = at 103.63 inches. According to Scaled Composites, the design gross weight = limit is 1,425 pounds and the CG range is from the forward limit of 98 inches = to the rear limit of 103 inches. In a telephone interview on June 15, 1998, an engineering representative from Scaled Composites reported that originally the aircraft was = designed with a published aft limit of 104 inches in mind, and the prototype was extensively tested and flown at this limit. Subsequently, in the = interests of conservative margins, the designer changed the published limit to 103 inches. During flight test work, the prototype was flown at 106 inches = and flew all test points satisfactorily with no adverse handling = characteristics noted. The Scaled Composites representative also reported that the company flew = the same profile as the accident flight in a O-320 equipped Long-EZ (start, taxi, run-up, takeoff, three touch-and-goes, and a pattern departure) = and measured the fuel consumed at 3.6 gallons. After running one tank dry, a time interval of 6 to 8 seconds was measured between changing the fuel selector and resumption of engine power. Concerning the accident = aircraft's fuel system, he reported that while the fuel tanks of the accident = aircraft were extensively damaged, during the wreckage reconstruction he observed that the fuel tanks were built to plan specifications. The system as designed does not have an unusable quantity. Two sumps are located in = the tanks with about a quart capacity each. The tank design is such that the fuel will feed into the sumps in all flight attitudes. The only known condition which would tend to favor an unporting is in a prolonged = descent with just a few gallons in the tank. Concerning the yaw flight controls, he reported that the rudders move = and act like vertical spoilers. Pressing on the right rudder peddle moves = only the right rudder in an outboard direction, which produces increased drag = and a subsequent yawing moment. The rudders are very effective due to the = long moment arm. With a center of effort (increased drag) above the = longitudinal CG, activation of a rudder will produce a pitch-up moment along with the yaw. The aircraft also has a very strong spiral mode. He also reported = that the lateral roll control with the side stick controller is very = sensitive and that a 1/8 inch movement will cause a roll initiation. Review of the FAA Aircraft Registry file for the aircraft revealed that = the original builder applied for an airworthiness certificate in the amateur built experimental category on May 5, 1987. The airworthiness = certificate was issued by an FAA Airworthiness Inspector from the Houston, Texas, = Flight Standards District Office on June 12, 1987. On the application, the inspector checked the box stating "I have found the aircraft described = meets the requirements for the certificate requested." A letter of operating limitations was also issued on that date and included the statement = "This aircraft shall contain the placards, listings and instrument markings required by FAR 91.3 (Subsequently redesignated 14 CFR 91.9)." According to the designer of the airplane and the drawings issued to the builder, the fuel selector is to be located just aft of the nose wheel position window between the pilot's legs. The accident airplane's fuel selector handle was positioned by the builder on the bulkhead behind the pilot's left shoulder. The selector valve was installed inside the = engine firewall 45 inches aft of the selector handle. The handle and valve were joined by steel and aluminum tubing, connected by a universal joint. During postaccident examination, the selector handle was found not = marked for any operating position. The lack of marking was verified by the = checkout pilot and the person performing the last condition inspection just prior = to the repaint. The checkout pilot stated that the selector handle = positions were: up for off; pointing inboard (to the right) for left tank; and = down for the right tank. According to the designer and the seller, the airplane has two 26-gallon fuel tanks in the wing roots, all of which is usable fuel. The fuel = quantity is determined by viewing non-linear fuel sight gauges located in the = rear cockpit at the wing roots. The sight gauges show an amount of actual = fuel supporting a red float. Postaccident examination disclosed that the = sight gauges were not marked or calibrated for quantity. The maintenance technician who helped the pilot move the aircraft out of = the hangar before the accident flight mentioned that the fuel sight gauges = were only visible to the rear cockpit occupant. The pilot then asked the technician about the quantity shown. The technician told the pilot that = he had "less than half in the right tank and less than a quarter in the = left tank." The technician said he based his interpolation of the fuel = quantity on the assumption that the gauge presentation was linear. The technician provided a shop inspection mirror to the pilot to look over his shoulder = at the fuel sight gauges. The mirror was recovered in the wreckage. According to other pilots who were familiar with the aircraft and/or had flown it, in order to change the fuel selector you had to: 1) Remove = hand from the right side control stick if hand flying the aircraft; 2) = Release the shoulder harness; 3) Turn upper body 90 degrees to the left to reach = the handle; and 4) Turn the handle to another position. Two pilots shared experiences of having inadvertently run a fuel tank dry with near catastrophic consequences because of the selector and sight gauge = locations. Postaccident wreckage examination by the Safety Board revealed that the selector handle was not placarded or marked for any operating position. = The handle in the right position was for the left tank, the handle in the = down position was for the right tank, and the off position was up. During the postaccident investigation, attempts were made to perform = this function of switching fuel tanks in another Long EZ. Each time during = the process of turning the body 90 degrees in order to reach the valve, the natural tendency was to extend the right foot unconsciously against the right rudder pedal to support the body while turning in the seat. The aircraft logbooks were not recovered. According to the seller of the aircraft, the airframe and engine had accumulated about 850 total flight hours. He reported that the last FAA required 12-month condition = inspection had been accomplished on September 20, 1997. According to the checkout pilot, and confirmed by the seller, the canard = had the later Ronz No. 1145ms airfoil. The checkout pilot who repositioned the aircraft from Santa Ynez to = Santa Maria for repainting estimated that prior to his departure it had 4 to 5 gallons of fuel onboard between the two tanks, and he added 20 gallons, = 10 gallons per side. The flight to Santa Maria lasted 20 minutes and = consumed 4 gallons. During the pilot's 30-minute checkout at Santa Maria, the = checkout pilot estimated that about 5 gallons of fuel were consumed. The checkout pilot said he did not update the Fuelwatch (2) fuel monitoring = instrument following refueling because he was not familiar with the procedure. He stated that the pilot flew the aircraft from Santa Maria to Monterey, = and had departed with about 15 gallons of fuel onboard. There were 10 = gallons in the right tank and 5 gallons in the left tank. He noted that the = selector was located on the right tank prior to the pilot's departure from Santa Maria. The Safety Board and the party participants to the investigation = estimated that the amount of fuel required to fly to Monterey from Santa Maria = ranged from 6.4 to 9.1 gallons, depending on the power settings used. Estimates = for the checkout flight at Santa Maria ranged from 2.5 to 3.6 gallons. The accident flight was estimated to consume 3.0 to 4.3 gallons, for = combined total consumption of 11.9 to 17.0 gallons. Fueling records disclosed = that the aircraft was not refueled at Monterey Airport. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The wreckage was located in about 30 feet of water within about 150 = yards of the rocky shoreline. Examination of an underwater video taken by a = National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary diver revealed broken rock structures where the aircraft = wreckage was located on the sea bed and the he opined that they were struck underwater by the airplane. The broken sections of rock were free of = normal underwater growth. The recovery was made by the Pacific Grove Ocean Rescue and Sheriff's = Dive Team members. All major structural components of the airframe were found = in a fragmented state on the ocean floor near the engine. Most of the = control system rods and rod ends were recovered. The landing gear assembly was separated from the fuselage, with the right wheel and brake separated = from it's gear leg. The nose gear was found in the retracted position. The engine was found separated from the airframe structure but remained attached to it's mounts. The mounts were crushed in a rear to front direction. There were two induction tubes found broken from the engine. = The wooden composite covered propeller hub was still attached to the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades were severed about 18 inches outboard of the hub center. Fragmented composite propeller blade = covering and blade wood was recovered near the engine. Subsequent layout = disclosed that the fragments comprised the leading edges of both blades. The engine was examined externally and internally. Gear and valve train continuity was established by rotation. Cylinder compression was established. All cylinders were removed and examined. The accessory = housing was removed for examination of the oil pump gears and crankshaft gear. = The carburetor was removed and opened for a visual examination. Fuel and = water was found in the carburetor bowl. The magnetos had been replaced with an electronic ignition system. There were no discrepancies found during = these examinations. During the investigation, the wreckage was laid out with the recovered components placed in their normal positions. All aircraft extremities = were accounted for in the examination. All recovered control system push-pull tubes and associated bell cranks were examined, with overload signatures evident and no unusual operating condition noted. No battering or over travel signatures were observed to any control limit stop. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION On October 13, 1997, the Monterey County Medical Examiner performed an autopsy on the pilot. According to the report, the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma. During the examination samples were = obtained for toxicological analysis by the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Tests were negative for all screened drugs and Ethanol. TESTS AND RESEARCH INFORMATION The fuel selector, linkage, universal joint, handle, and handle bearing block were recovered. The brass selector stem/shaft was found fractured between two opposing drilled rivet holes that attach the hollow portion = of the shaft to the torque tube/handle linkage. The Safety Board Materials Laboratory examined the stem/shaft fracture. Though the stem/shaft was severely weakened by the rivet addition, there was no evidence found = during the examination that would suggest that the stem broke prior to the = crash impact. A copy of the laboratory report is attached. The brass 3 port Imperial valve assembly was examined and found to be in = an intermediate position which was half open between the engine feed line = and the right tank fuel supply line. The port to the left tank was also = observed to be open about 10 percent to the engine feed line. The valve was found frozen in place and could not be moved. The fuel valve was plumbed into = an engine test cell, with the fuel supply connected to the valve's right = tank fuel port. At that point, the left tank port was open to the atmosphere = and was subsequently capped. An exemplar Lycoming O-320 engine was installed = in the test cell, started and run to maximum power. The half-open right = port position had negligible affect on the engine power output; however, when = the cap was removed from the left port (simulating the effect of an empty = left tank) the fuel pressure dropped to less than half, and within a few = seconds the engine quit from vapor. The steel and aluminum rods connecting the handle to the fuel selector = valve were found bent when recovered. The rods were straightened to determine handle position relative to the valve position. Extensive metallurgical = and installation examinations were performed at the Safety Board Materials Laboratory and with exemplar aircraft in the field. Copies of the = laboratory reports are attached. The Safety Board examined the recovered wreckage for evidence of a = possible bird strike. There were no leading edge canard or wing sections intact. = The canopy was destroyed, with only fragments of the Plexiglas recovered. = Bird feathers were found commingled in the recovered wreckage. The curator of = the local Museum of Natural History was asked to view the feathers during = the wreckage examination. A seat cushion determined to be from the accident airplane was found torn open. According to the cushion material tag, it = was filled with goose feathers; however, the curator also found duck = feathers in the cushion. The cushion feathers matched the ones found commingled with = the wreckage. The fuel selector handle location was discussed with the seller and = other pilots who had flown the aircraft. The seller reported that he had asked = the builder why he had located it behind the pilot's left shoulder. The = builder responded that he did not want fuel in the cockpit area. The seller said when he changed tanks in-flight he would engage the autopilot. This = would free his right hand from the control stick to reach around behind his = left shoulder to the selector handle. The seller said that at the time of the accident the handle was "firm to turn with good detents." He also said = that the checkout pilot had removed the selector valve for cleaning and lubricating some time ago. The checkout pilot said that the seller = attempted to work on the valve in early 1996, but that he (the checkout pilot) = ended up finishing the repair in April 1996. He also said that he had removed = the two rivets that were drilled through the brass valve shaft and had = replaced one of the two torque tubes. The checkout pilot was asked about the selector. He said that he had simulated changing tanks using the selector on one occasion on the = ground and he did not care for the location. Due to the difficulties of using = the selector he had never used the selector in flight. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The wreckage was released to the insurance adjuster representing the = pilot on June 10, 1998. When last viewed by the Safety Board, the wreckage was located at Monterey, California. 1 A type of airplane in which the auxiliary controls are mounted ahead = of the main lifting plane. The controls normally mounted on the tail of the airplane are mounted ahead of the wing on the Canard. 2 A fuel management system that provides a fuel burn rate and fuel remaining. - ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01BD9E00.CC868B00-- ------------------------------ End of krnet-l-digest V2 #102 *****************************